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Congress overwhelmingly passed the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA or the "Act") 1
and President Bush signed it into law. The Act has been
called by a noted scholar "the most significant civil rights
enactment in a generation ..."2
,
but its impact has been
appreciated only slowly by communities in North Caro-
lina and other states.
What the Act Does.
The FHAA brings persons with disabilities under the
protection of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, and extends to these persons
too the promise ofequal housing opportunity. The path-
breaking original Fair Housing Act determined that
many long-standing government and private practices
that reduced the housing options of blacks and other
minorities were unlawful. The FHAA is equally path-
breaking in extending these same rights to persons with
disabilities as well as to families with children. Race and
disability are now on equal standing under the law;
discrimination in housing against either group is unlaw-
ful.
As Congress explained, the Act:
is a clear pronouncement of a national commitment
to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
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handicaps from the American mainstream. It repudi-
ates the use of stereotypes and ignorance, and man-
dates that persons with handicaps be considered as
individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabili-
ties and unfounded speculations about threats to
safety are specifically rejected as grounds to justify
exclusion.3
In passing the Act, Congress recognized that people
who have disabilities are full members of the commu-
nity; as with any other group of people, some are good
neighbors and some are not. What theFHAA in essence
says is that, just as with race, no one may determine
where persons with disabilities may live based merely on
their label or status. Rather, as with every other citizen,
housing decisions that others make for a person with
disabilities may be based only on how that individual
acts.
The Reach of the Act Is Wide
In sweeping language, the Act makes it unlawful for
any individual or government "[t]o discriminate in the
sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap
...."
4 The Act further makes it unlawful for any individ-
ual or government "[t]o discriminate against any person
in the terms, conditions, orprivileges ofsale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection with such dwelling, because of a handi-
cap...."5
The reach of the FHAA is so great because it does not
simply prohibit actions taken with the intent to discrimi-
nate against persons with disabilities, it also prohibits
apparently neutral practices that, whether intended or
not, have the effect of restricting the housing options of
persons with disabilities.6 In addition, the FHAA pro-
vides even greater protection on the basis of handicaps
than on the basis of race by affirmatively requiring
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individuals and municipalities to make "reasonable ac-
commodations" in appropriate circumstances. The Act
does so by defining discrimination to include:
a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in
rules, policies, practices, or services, when such ac-
commodations may be necessary to afford such per-
son equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 7
Thus, as a whole, the Act prohibits practices that deny
people with disabilities the right to choose where they
wish to live by prohibiting discriminatory practices against
individuals with any "handicap." The Act defines the
term "handicap" broadly to mean "(1) a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (2) a record
of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as
having such an impairment ...."8
The FHAA does not protect people who currently
engage in unlawful use of controlled substances, but it
does protect individualswho are in a treatment program
for drug or alcohol abuse. 9 The Act does not protect
persons "whose tenancywould constitute a direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals or whose
tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to
the property of others." 10 The House Report makes
clear, however, that direct threat can only be demon-
strated through "a history of overt acts or current con-
duct" of a particular individual, not a generalized fear of
the person's disability. 11
The Act Encourages Enforcement
The FHAA makes the entire Fair Housing Act more
effective by attracting competent attorneys to bring fair
housing cases through allowing generous damages
(including punitive damages) awards and allowing the
award of attorney's fees. The FHAA also extends the
statute of limitations. In addition, the Act liberalizes
"standing" rules by extending the definition of persons
who are considered "aggrieved" and therefore able to
sue. The Act includes among those who are entitled to
relief (1) any person who claims to have been injured by
a discriminatory housing practice, or (2) any personwho
believes that such a person will be injured by a discrimi-
natory housing practice that is about to occur. 12 As a
result, advocacy organizations and housing providers
are included among thosewho may sue under the Act. 13
The FHAA's Largest Impact on
Municipalities: Zoning Practices
The Fair Housing Act, of which the FHAA is now a
part, explicitly trumps local and state laws that conflict
with it. 14 As mentioned, Section 3604(f) of the FHAA
makes it unlawful for any individual or government " [t]o
discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling" because ofhandicap. By
its terms, this language covers discriminatory land-use
decisions by municipalities. 15 Decisions by courts de-
scribing the same language of the original Fair Housing
Act make clear that this section does cover land-use and
zoning actions. 16 As the House Report to the FHAA
stated in explaining both disability provisions:
These new subsections would also apply to state or
local land use and health and safety laws, regulations,
practices or decisions which discriminate against in-
dividuals with handicaps. While state and local gov-
ernments have authority to protect safety and health,
and to regulate use of land, that authority has some-
times been used to restrict the ability of individuals
with handicaps to live in communities ....The Commit-
tee intends that the prohibition against discrimination
against those with handicaps apply to zoning decisions
and practices. The Act is intended to prohibit the
application ofspecial requirements through land-use
regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or
special use permits that have the effect of limiting the
ability of such individuals to live in the residence of
their choice in the community. 17
Since the amendments went into effect in 1989, a
number ofcourts have found that municipalities' zoning
regulations and decisions that denied zoning approval
to facilities for the handicapped violated the Act. 18
Dispersal Statutes
Many municipalities have passed statutes that re-
quire that homes intended for persons with disabilities
be located a certain distance from other such homes.
Dispersal requirements impose a quota of one home
intended for persons with disabilities within a certain
area. It was legally well-established under the Fair Housing
Act of 1968 that quotas intended to prevent a protected
class of people from becoming overconcentrated in one
area violate the Act. 19 Dispersal statutes also squarely
violate the FHAA since a flat ban against permitting a
home occupied by individuals with handicaps to be
placed within a certain area does "make unavailable or
deny a dwelling to [a] buyer or renter because of a
handicap."20 In fact, that is the exact purpose ofdisper-
sal zoning provisions: to deny use of that dwelling to
persons with disabilities.
In a decision affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, a Pennsylvania federal district court concluded
that dispersal requirements indeed violate the FHAA21
The Maryland legislature repealed a 1 ,000-foot distance
requirement for facilities housing people with disabili-
ties based on an opinion issued by the Maryland Attor-
ney General advising the legislature that such a rule was
illegal under the FHAA22 The City of Portland, Ore-
gon did the same.
Congress could not have been more clear that rules
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such as distance limits that have the effect of denying
individuals with disabilities the choice of where to live
can no longer be maintained. 23 There is an isolated
court case to the contrary,24 which is poorly reasoned
and unlikely to be adopted elsewhere because it bases its
decision on a U.S. Supreme Court case decided before
passage of the FHAA. In fact, the U.S. Department of
Justice continues to bring litigation based on the posi-
tion that dispersal statutes are unlawful under the FHAA
Occupancy Restrictions
The second major zoning rule that affects persons
with disabilities prescribes the maximum number of
persons who are allowed to live in a house. While
municipalities generally do not limit the number of
related persons who can live in a house, many do limit
the number of unrelated persons who may live together
to between three and five. This rule presents a problem
for persons with disabilities because, as courts have
found, they must often live in greater numbers because
of their special needs. 25 For some individuals with dis-
abilities a group set ting maybe necessary for therapeutic
reasons; for others, their incomes are so low as a result
of their disabilities that resources must be pooled to
allow a program to succeed financially. Some courts
have suggested and the Department of Justice believes
that allowing sufficient densities for housing persons
with disabilities is required by the "reasonable accom-
modations in rules, policies, practices, or services,"
provision of the Act. 26 Also, the Act's legislative history
suggests that the prohibition against discriminating "in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling,"27 would prohibit zoning practices "which
have the effect ofexcluding ... congregate living arrange-
ments for persons with handicaps."28 Thus, municipali-
ties must allow occupancy limits that are responsive to
the special needs of persons with disabilities.
Special Use Permit Requirements
Many municipalities also require those developing
housing for persons with disabilities to obtain a special-
use type permit in a public proceeding. For a municipal-
ity to require individuals with disabilities to obtain a
permit that is not required of others in order to live in a
certain neighborhood discriminates in the "terms [and]
conditions" of housing. 29 Additionally, the Act would
bar municipalities from legislating procedural require-
ments that "otherwise make unavailable or deny" hous-
ing to people with disabilities. As the House Report
concludes, the FHAA prohibits "conditional or special
use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of
such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in
the community."30 The public approval process often
tends to mobilize neighborhoods unfairly against such
houses based on stereotypes rather than conduct or
experience.31 Under the FHAA, Courts have not hesi-
tated to strike down procedures such as these that are
not required of everyone, uniformly.32
Enforcement of the FHAA
The potential options to enforce the FHAA if some-
one determines that their federal fair housing rights
have been violated are dizzying. There are a number of
avenues by which aggrieved parties can seek legal reme-
dies.
Sue Privately under FHAA
An individual or group's first option is to bring suit
privately in either state or federal court under the FHAA
There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies
before bringing suit under the federal law. Should the
partywho sues win, the losing party will have to pay the
winner's attorney's fees through the cost-shifting provi-
sion of the Act.
File a Complaint with HUD
Alternatively, the party can file a complaint with the
agency charged with enforcing the Act, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
HUD, in turn, refers the complaint either to the U.S.
Department ofJustice or to the North Carolina Human
Relations Commission (HRC).
U.S. Department ofJustice
Ifthe case concerns zoning,HUD will likely refer it to
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for prosecution,
as specifically directed in the Act to ensure effective
enforcement ofzoning and land-use matters. 33 DOJ can
bring suit itself in federal court or intervene in an
existing suit brought by a private party or the HRC.34 In
addition, an aggrieved party can bring concerns directly
to DOJ initially.
N.C. Human Relations Commission
When HUD receives a complaint that is not appro-
priate for referral to the Department of Justice, HUD
likely will refer it to the HRC. HUD makes this referral
because it has determined the HRC to be a "substan-
tially equivalent" agency to HUD with respect to fair
housing enforcement. HUD made this determination
because the HRC's enabling legislation-the State Fair
Housing Act-in large part tracks the federal Act. A
private party also can file a complaint with the HRC
directly under the state law as an alternative to using the
federal law. Before suing privately under the state law,
an individual must exhaust administrative remedies by
filing first with the HRC.
The HRC investigates all cases referred to it, which
provides free discovery to plaintiffs, and determines
whether there are "reasonable grounds" to bring suit. If
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it determines that reasonable grounds exist, the HRC is
then required to enforce the state law (even if the
original complaint was to HUD under the federal law).
If either party or the HRC desires to sue in court, the
HRC itself will bring suit in state court under the state
law. This occurs about half the time. 35 Otherwise, the
HRC will bring the case to the Office of Administrative
Hearings, where it is heard by an administrative law
judge, who recommends a decision to a panel of three
HRC commissioners. On the other hand, if the HRC
does not find reasonable grounds to sue, it issues the
complaining individual a right to sue letter. At this time,
the party may bring suit privately under the state law or
still may choose to sue under the federal law.
In general, particularly in zoning cases, aggrieved par-
ties will probably find their rights better protected by
using the federal rather than
the state law because rights
under the federal FHAA are
clearer and the case law is
better developed.
North Carolina
Communities and the
FHAA
North Carolina, even be-
fore adoption of the FHAA,
recognized the special occu-
pancy requirements of per-
sons with disabilities and the
problems inherent in special
use permits in such cases.
In 1981 the General As-
sembly enacted a statute that
authorized family care homes
of up to six handicapped resi-
dents plus staff to be located
in any residential zoning dis-
trict in the state and prohib- GrouP home forpersons with
ited the requirement of any special approval proce-
dure.36 The statute states North Carolina's purpose "to
provide handicapped persons with the opportunity to
live in a normal residential environment." The statute
does, however, allow municipalities to impose a half-
mile dispersal rule.
Many municipalities still retain dispersal and special
use requirements and have unduly restrictive occupancy
standards for persons with disabilities. Now that the
FHAA is law, state and local governments may face
costly legal actions if they fail to eliminate statutes that
in effect make a dwelling unavailable to any buyer or
renter because of a handicap.
While North Carolina communities have not reacted
swiftly to change local statutes following passage of the
Fair Housing Amendments Act, a number of questions
have been raised about the legality of existing laws, and
during the past two years many local practices have been
challenged.
Durham Sets a Good Example
Shortly after passage of the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act, a use permit to build a house on a noncon-
forming lot of record was requested in the City of Dur-
ham. Such permits are routinely granted by the City's
Board ofAdjustment ifthe proposed house is physically
compatible with surrounding houses. This particular
house was being built for persons with mental illness,
and when neighbors learned of the proposed use, they
made a number of calls to the City opposing the home.
Before holding the hearing on the permit request, the
Durham Assistant City Attorney and the chair of the
mental illness.
Durham Board of Adjustment conferred and reviewed
existing law, including North Carolina General Statute
168-9, which generally protects the handicapped from
discrimination in housing, and the FHAA. They agreed
that comments about the disabled status of the residents
were irrelevant to the issuance of the permit and that
allowing such comments would prejudice the proceed-
ings by introducing evidence that could lead to imper-
missible discrimination.
A number of neighbors attended the hearing to op-
pose the permit. The first speaker was an advocate for
persons with mental disabilities, who was aware of
community opposition and planned to talk to the Board
about the need in Durham for the proposed home. The
Board chair interrupted at the first mention of mental
illness and stated that the status of the proposed resi-
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dents of the house was irrelevant and that the Board
therefore would not allow discussion about them. No
further discussion about the proposed residents or use
of the house was allowed from either the proponents or
the opponents. Evidence was limited to size, location,
and parking. The Board, properly treating the request as
it would any similar request for a single family home,
approved the permit.
The City ofHendersonville Is Ordered To Comply
In 1992, a North Carolina court ordered the City of
Hendersonville to approve a special use permit for a
housing development for persons with mental illness
following several months of heated community contro-
versy. In August 1991, after months of searching for a
suitable building site, the Mental Health Association in
North Carolina (MHA/NC) had signed an option to
purchase land in Hendersonville, where it planned to
construct eleven one-bedroom apartments for ten per-
sons with mental illness and a resident manager. The
individuals who would be able to move into the new
apartments were clients of the community mental health
program; their illnesses were stabilized with medica-
tion, and they received a number of other services that
enabled them to live independently in the community.
Generally, their housing at the time was neither decent
nor affordable, with most paying more than half of their
income for housing costs.
In response to an application for funding submitted
by MHA/NC, HUD had approved the site and commit-
ted to the project $494,100 for land acquisition and con-
struction and an additional $1 ,000,000 to be used over a
20-year period as rental assistance to make the apart-
ments affordable. The HUD fund reservation would
expire if construction did not begin by March 31, 1992.
As the developer of the proposed housing, the MHA/
NC hired an architect, who conferred with the Hender-
sonville City planner. Following the planner's guidance
about zoning requirements, the architect prepared and
submitted plans to the City alongwith anapplication for
a Planned Use Development (PUD) special use permit,
which the City routinely requires for all apartment
developments of more than four units.
The City planner reviewed the plans and the applica-
tion, saw that they met all city requirements for a PUD
permit, including all architectural, engineering, and
environmental requirements. He informed the MHA/
NC's architect that he would recommend approval and
that he anticipated that the Hendersonville Planning
and Zoning Board's approval at its January 1992 meet-
ing would be routine. At that meeting, however, one
member of the Board moved that the matter be tabled,
despite the City planner's recommendation. Neighbors
of the proposed project had learned that the apartments
were to be occupied by persons with mental illness and
had submitted a petition to the Board opposing the
project. During subsequent court action, it was alleged
that the Board member who moved to table the request
for a special use permit is the son of two individuals who
had signed the petition.37
This action by the Board alerted the MHA/NC to the
fact that community opposition had fallen on fertile
ground, and the organization contacted Carolina Legal
Assistance, which works with attorneys of local legal
services offices and pro bono attorneys to protect the
legal rights of individuals with mental disabilities. As a
result of this early contact, during each step of the
ensuing process, the statements and actions of both the
opponents and the Board members were closely moni-
tored and documented.
Once the development ofthese apartments was taken
off of the track that similar housing developments rou-
tinely follow, opposition by neighbors and others in the
community increased. At the Planning and Zoning Board's
February 1992 meeting, considerable discussion occurred
including, according to court documents, vociferous
opposition to the development. Among the concerns
expressed were drainage problems, flooding, devalu-
ation of property, and the "institutional effect" the
development might have on the neighborhood. One
resident declared that she did not want this "mental
institution" near her. 38
The City offered no technical or scientific evidence in
support of the drainage and flooding concerns. None-
theless, the Board voted to once again table the request
and to send it to a subcommittee for further study. The
subcommittee was chaired by the individual who had
initially moved to table the request.
At the March 1992 meeting of the Planning and
Zoning Board, the City planner stated that the plan met
all technical requirements and, again, recommended
approval. The subcommittee gave a report expressing its
belief that the apartment plan was "not in harmony with
the existing immediate residential neighborhood."39
To address concerns about flooding, the project's archi-
tect presented engineering data showing that the effect
of water runoff would be minimal-less than two inches
in a fifty-year storm. The MHA/NC addressed concerns
about property values by presenting studies showing
that values do not decline as a result of such develop-
ments. The Planning and Zoning Board, however, adopted
the subcommittee's recommendation to deny the re-
quest for a special use permit.
Faced with certain further delay, the MHA/NC re-
quested HUD to extend the fund reservation for the
apartments to September 30, 1992, and HUD granted
the extension, stating that further extensions would not
be granted.
According to the Zoning Ordinance of the City of
Hendersonville, Planning Board recommendations with
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respect to Planned Unit Developments must be re-
viewed and approved by the Mayor and the City Council.
The proposed development was discussed at the April
1992 meeting of the City Council. Again, neighborhood
opposition to the complex was vocal and included con-
cern that the neighborhood was near schools, and that
those living in the area wished to keep the neighborhood
family-oriented and safe. A member of the City Council
stated that the proposed plan was not compatible with
the "people" in the neighborhood. The architect for the
proposed development testified that it would not ad-
versely affect flooding in the area and that the complex
had been redesigned from two-story to one-story units
to better conform to the appearance of the surrounding
homes. No expert opinion or documentation was pre-
sented to support the contention that the development
would adversely affect flooding in the area.
The City planner again recommended approval of the
special use permit. The City Council voted unanimously
to deny approval. The stated reasons were that the
development would have an adverse impact on flooding
in the neighborhood, that the complex would have an
adverse impact on the single-family character of the
neighborhood, and that itwas not "in harmony" with the
neighborhood. In later court action, the plaintiffs pointed
out to the court that the site was zoned for apartments,
that apartment complexes in single-family neighbor-
hoods are common in Hendersonville, and that there
are, in fact, a privately owned triplex within 50 yards of
the site and eight units of public housing in duplex
format within 200 yards of it.
In May 1992, Carolina Legal Assistance and Pisgah
Legal Services, representing plaintiff Jeffrey Blackwell,
an individual who planned to move into the apartment
development, and an attorney for plaintiff MHA/NC
sued in state court to allow the project to go forward
before HUD funding would be withdrawn.
The attorneys stated that the City's denial of the
special use permit constituted a discriminatory housing
practice under three separate provisions of the Fair
Housing Amendments Act discussed earlier in this ar-
ticle. First, plaintiffs alleged that the City unlawfully
made the proposed residence unavailable to plaintiff
Blackwell because of his handicap in violation of Sec-
tion 3604(f)(1) of the Act. Second, plaintiffs accused the
City of violating Section (f)(3)(b) by refusing to make
reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, and prac-
tices so as to afford persons with handicaps equal oppor-
tunity to choose, use, and enjoy a residence. Third,
plaintiffs alleged that the City had treated plaintiffs
differently from persons without handicaps in the terms,
conditions, and/or privileges for residences in Hender-
sonville in violation of Section 3604(f)(2) of the Act.40
In papers filed with the court, plaintiffs stated that
while proof of discriminatory intent is not required
under the Act, such intent could be inferred in the
present case for the following leasons: (1) the City's
decision to withhold the special use permit had a dis-
criminatory impact, since the only class of persons af-
fected by the decision would be persons with mental
disabilities;41 (2) the City departed from normal zoning
procedures in repeatedly tabling the request and then
referring it to a special subcommittee chaired by a man
with a known conflict of interest;42 (3) members of the
decision-making body made contemporary statements
that indicated that they acted for the purpose of effectu-
ating the desires ofprivate citizens and that a motivating
factor behind those desires included the fact that the
proposed residents of the housing were mentally ill;43
(4) the concerns expressed by the City about the lay of
the land and drainage were clearly pretextual;44and (5)
the contentions that the plaintiffs' development was
"not in harmony" or "not compatible" with the neigh-
borhood were a thinly veiled camouflage for public
opposition based on fears and stereotypes about the
potential residents. 45
Following a hearing on the matter, Judge Julia Jones,
Superior Court Judge Presiding, issued an order based
on her finding that the defendant had no valid basis for
denying the special use permit and had violated the Fair
Housing Act, as amended, in denying the permit. The
judge also found that plaintiffs "would incur immediate,
irreparable injury if an injunction is not issued because
they have no other adequate remedy at law to preserve
their rights to substantial HUD funding to build the
needed housing for mentally handicapped people."46
The Judge's order was clear and, in its broad scope,
ensured that the housing project could be developed
without further interference:
It is ordered that the defendant and all other persons,
boards and bodies who are its officers, officials, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys are hereby perma-
nently enjoined from failing to grant plaintiffMental
Health Association in North Carolina, Inc. a Planned
Use Development permit for the site ... Defendant
and all other persons, boards and bodies who are its
officers, officials, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys are also enjoined permanently from failing
to make all reasonable accommodations in rules,
policies, practices, or services as may be necessary to
afford mentally handicapped individuals the oppor-
tunity to reside in the development planned byMHA
... Any violation of this Judgment is in contempt of
court and punishable by both civil and criminal con-
tempt powers of this court upon proper showing.
The City ofAlbemarle Avoids a Legal Challenge
In 1993, the MHA/NC submitted an application to
HUD for funding to develop apartments for individuals
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with mental illness in Albemarle. When local citizens
learned of the pending application, they contacted the
Center Director of the Stanly County Mental Health
Program and City Council members and voiced their
opposition. The City Council requested the Center
Director canvas the people living in the area to find out
how the neighbors would feel about such a project. The
Center Director declined to do so, informing the City
Council that, in his opinion, this would violate the Fair
Housing Amendments Act.
When local citizens continued calling the mental
health center about the proposed housing, the Director
contacted the consultant for the MHA/NC to obtain a
copy of the Fair Housing Amendments Act. He also
obtained information about the court order against
Hendersonville and contacted staff in that city to learn
more about their experience with community opposi-
tion. The impression he gained from a Hendersonville
staff person was that the judge "had ordered them to
issue the permit or they could all go to jail."47
The Center Director then hosted a meeting to inform
the community about the need for the housing and
about the rights guaranteed to individuals with disabili-
ties by the Fair Housing Amendments Act. Subsequently,
HUD approved the application, and the developer an-
ticipates receiving full cooperation from the City of
Apartments forpeople with mental illness, sponsored by the Mental Health Association in North Carolina.
Albemarle during construction of the project.
Raleigh Exhibits Enlightened Self-Interest
The City of Raleigh Zoning Code classifies facilities
that provide housing for persons with disabilities (and
other designated special population groups) according
to whether they are a group care facility, family care
home, or family group home. Different facilities allow
different occupancies, may be located in different zon-
ing districts, and must be located a half mile away from
another facility in that category and 100 yards from a
facility in another category. The classification system
was developed in an ad hoc manner and is cumbersome.
The Raleigh Code also requires the issuance ofa special
use permit for group care facilities through a quasi-
judicial evidentiary hearing.
The Raleigh Code's legality after passage of the FHAA
has recently been challenged by two parties. The first in-
dividual was denied zoning permission to open a family
care home because it would be located (just) within a
half-mile of an existing family care home. She filed a
complaint with the N.C. Human Relations Commis-
sion, which investigated and referred the case to the U.S.
Department of Justice.
In the second case, Raleigh has threatened five Ox-
ford House, Inc. houses with closure because they don't
meet the family care home requirements that (1) there
be no more than six persons with disabilities in a house
and (2) there be on-site staffsupervision. Oxford House
sponsors houses in which up to ten persons recovering
from substance addiction live on their own. Oxford
House believes that people stop abusing substances by
assuming the responsibility of maintaining a job and a
household and by peer pressure-a resident is kicked out
if he or she uses substances
again. The effectiveness of
peer pressure, according to
Oxford House, would be
undermined by the presence
ofstaffon site. Oxford House
filed a complaint against
Raleigh with HUD and re-
tained a local attorney. HUD
also referred the case to the
Department of Justice.
As a result ofthe referral
of these cases, lawyers from
the Department of Justice
met with the staff of the
Raleigh City Attorney's of-
fice. Following this meet-
ing, the Raleigh City Attor-
ney reported to the Law and
finance Committee of the
Raleigh City Council that
the Justice Department was prepared to bring suit against
the City if it enforced the current zoning laws regarding
dispersal, occupancy and supervision in the two cases at
hand.
Two lawyers from the Department ofJustice met with
the staff of the Raleigh City Attorney's office and com-
municated the Department's firm position that Raleigh's
dispersal statute is unlawful under the FHAA, that
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Raleigh must make a reasonable accommodation to
Oxford House by allowing larger numbers of individuals
to occupy one residence, and that Raleigh cannot insist
that an Oxford House residence must have on-site staff
supervision since this runs counter to the needs of
residents. The DOJ lawyers indicated that they would
bring suit against the City if it enforced the zoning laws
as written.
Partly as a consequence of this meeting, the Law and
Finance Committee of the
Raleigh City Council has
re-examined its treatment
ofspecial population hous-
ing. The City Attorney rec-
ommended that the City
eliminate dispersal require-
ments entirely and accom-
modate greater occupancies
to satisfy the Justice De-
partment's interpretation of
the FHAA The Commit-
tee, over a five month pe-
riod, heard from numerous
groups representing persons
with disabilities and other
special needs as well as many
neighborhood representa-
tives. It has now developed
a recommendation that has
been scheduled for public
hearing before the full Council and the Planning Com-
mission that does not fully satisfy any group but is a
constructive effort to meet the requirements of the
FHAA, special population housing needs, and neigh-
borhood interests.
The Law and Finance proposal has three significant
aspects. First, it continues not to limit where housing for
persons with disabilities may be located if it meets
existing occupancy requirements-that is, the housing
allows no more than four unrelated persons in a dwell-
ing unit. Second, the proposal allows a larger number of
occupants with disabilities to reside in a dwelling that is
"supervised" by on-site staff. It permits up to two adults
to live in a bedroom, with no upper limit on the number
who can live in the house. Up to four children (related to
the adults) may share the bedroom with one or two
adults. Groups who choose this option, however, will
have to abide by an "incentive" dispersal requirement of
300 yards from another such high occupancy dwelling.
Groups appearing before the Committee generally ac-
cepted this reduced spacing requirement in exchange for
the other provisions of the proposal. This housing,
different from current law, could be placed in any zoning
district in the city and there would be no special parking
requirements to avoid making the house appear institu-
tional. Also, there would be no requirement to comply
with a special process to gain permission for this use;
instead, groups would register their locations and occu-
pancies with the City to ensure that they abide by the
300-yard spacing requirement.
Finally, the proposal provides a reasonable accom-
modation for persons with mental disabilities in a par-
ticularly creative manner. Surveys have shown that the
vast majority of persons with mental disabilities desire
Apartments forpeople with physical disabilities including families with children, developed by the
North Carolina Community Land Trusteesand theHandicappedHousingCorporation ofDurham.
to live alone or with a chosen roommate in residential
neighborhoods scattered throughout the community. In
addition, numerous studies have shown that this "sup-
portive housing" model, with services available "off-
site" and on demand, not only is generally preferred but
also is effective.48
Local groups who attempt to meet this need for
persons who are able to live independently have found
that it is met most effectively in multi-unit one bedroom
housing. This type of housing, however, is only available
in the downtown areas that are zoned for higher-density
housing. In other parts of the city this type housing
either is not allowed (for example, in R-4 zoning) or is
too expensive to develop because more land is required
where zoning density allowances are lower. These groups
argued that the impact of housing for people with dis-
abilities on the neighborhood is reduced if up to four
persons have their own apartments than if they are
forced to live together in one dwelling unit, with conse-
quent roommate frictions.49 The Law and Finance
proposal responds to these concerns by allowing up to
four attached units of housing to be treated as a single
family dwelling anywhere in the city so long as the total
number of persons in the "Multi-Unit Supportive Housing
Residence" does not exceed six.
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The Law and Finance proposal still is vulnerable to
challenge under theFHAA because it includes 300-yard
dispersal and "supervision" requirements, and it has yet
to be adopted by the full City Council. If adopted,
however, it would be a significant improvement over
existing law that is worthy of the attention of other
North Carolina communities.
The Department ofJustice Visits Charlotte
In 1993, residents of a neighborhood in Charlotte
voiced strong opposition to the construction that was
underway in their area of a group home for individuals
with AIDS. Following this opposition, the City of Char-
lotte canceled the previously approved building permit.
The non-profit organization that had received funding
from HUD to develop the home filed a complaint with
HUD pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 3610(g)(2)(C).
HUD staff determined that the complaint involved the
legality of a zoning ordinance. Since a number of other
organizations were complaining that their group homes
also had been negatively affected by City actions, it
seemed that a pattern or practice of discriminatory
treatment of projects for the disabled might be occur-
ring in Charlotte. HUD referred the complaint to the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
In late October 1993, staff attorneys of the DOJ
visited Charlotte and met with staff ofa number of non-
profit organizations that provide housing for persons
with disabilities and their consultant. The DOJ attor-
neys were told ofa number ofactions that had prevented
or delayed development of projects and that these
actions were not routinely experienced by developers of
single family homes in similarly zoned neighborhoods in
Charlotte. Actions that were thought to be discrimina-
tory included not allowing parking in the required set-
back area, requiring space-consuming turn-around ar-
eas, and imposing special technical requirements for
water lines.50
Following this meeting, the DOJ attorneys met with
legal staff of the City of Charlotte. Further action is
pending.cp
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